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CASE NOTES
CORPORATIONS - Removal of Officer - Right to
Compensation for Period Between Illegal Removal and Sub-
sequent Ratification. - The plaintiff was employed as
officer of the defendant corporation, the employment contract
allowing plaintiff to be removed by the board of directors
without cause at the board's pleasure. It had been adjudi-
cated previously that the board invalidly removed plain-
tiff without a quorum present on June 2, 1959, but a quorum
of the board of directors had legally ratified his removal on
July 21, 1959. The plaintiff brought suit to recover his sal-
ary for the period between the invalid removal and the" rati-
fication. HELD: Even though in certain situations a rati-
fication may bestow legality on an earlier invalid act, the
ratification did not validate the prior action to the extent of
defeating the officer's claim for compensatiom Essential
Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Products, Inc., 164 A.
2d 437 (Del. 1960).
Where the board of directors is empowered to remove an
officer at will without cause, action of some kind by the board
signifying its intention that the officer shall no longer hold
office is necessary to constitute a valid removal of the cor-
porate officer. Ginter v. Heco Envelope Co., 316 Ill. 183, 147
N.E. 42, 63 A. L. R. 780 (1925) ; Keil v. Medart Mfg. Co., 46
S.W. 2d 934, (Mo. 1932). Charter, statutory, or by-law pro-
visions relative to removal must be observed for the removal
to be effective; thus, where the by-laws provide for removal
of an officer by a certain vote of the board of directors, Des-
patch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205
(1841); Stephany v. Liberty Cut Glass Co., 76 N. J. L. 449,
69 Atl. 967 (1908), action of anyone not authorized to re-
move an officer, e.g., the individual and separate action of a
portion of the directors not constituting a quorum, is illegal.
Hamlin v. Union Brass, 68 N. H. 292, 44 AUt. 385 (1895);
Keil v. Medart Mfg. Co., supra. The later ratification of a
removal at a legal meeting constitutes a removal as of the
subsequent date, for a corporation cannot ratify absolutely
void or ultra vires acts. D'arcy v. T. and C. R. Co., L. R. 2
Exch. 158 (1867); State v. Fla. Central R. R. Co., 15 Fla.
690 (1876) ; Gentry-Futeh Co. v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 473 (1925).
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The corporation will be liable for a breach of contract in the
case of improper discharge, as the mere device of discharg-
ing an officer from his office cannot deprive him of his right
to a salary. Ala. Lime and Stone Co. v. Adams, 218 Ala. 647,
119 So. 853 (1928) ; Barber v. Southern Service, 182 Ga. 124,
185 S. E. 93 (1936). The officer may recover his salary from
the time of improper discharge as compensation for being de-
prived of the chance of continuing to earn salary in accord-
ance with his contract. Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v.
Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Realty Acc. Corp. v. Mont-
gomery, 51 F. 2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930). The mere lessening of
the duties of an officer does not abrogate an agreement to pay
him a salary. Metropolitan Rubber Co. v. Place, 147 Fed. 90
(2d Cir. 1906). Where an officer is paid a salary as officer
and not for the performance of extra services, the suspension
of work dispensing with the necessity of the extra services
will not operate to affect the right to recover salary.
Bligh v. Peoples Packing Co., 192 IlL App. 83 (1915). His
suspension is a mere enforced-vacation for which thbe board
must pay him as if he -had never been suspended. State ex.
rel. Charles v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Or-
leans, 159 La. 69, 77, 105 So. 228 (1925). An officer who'has
never been lawfully dismissed is entitled to receive his sal-
ary during his tenure of employment or until such time as
he has been lawfully removed. State of La. ex. rel. Boucher
v. Heard, 228 La. 1078, 84 So. 2d 827 (1955) ; Hearty v. Dept.
of Police, City of New Orleans,- 238 La. 956, 117 So. 2d 71
(1960). "
With exceptions not here pdrtfnent, the governing body.:of
a corporation, as such, is the agent of the corporation..only
when it acts as an entity and not when its members -act as.
individuals. Hence, it follows that ordinarily its members
have no power to act except when assembled at a legally held
board meeting with a quorum present. Individual .action of
the persons comprising such governing body is not the action
of the constituted body of men clothed with the corporate
powers. If the rule were -otherwise, unethical directors
could connive to have any meeting illegally assembled and
thereby make many actions of -the board voidable, subject
at a subsequent legal meeting to ratification from the time
of the illegal action if this would serve the ends of the cor-
poration. A premium would be placed on invalid action and
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wronged officials discouraged from justifying their rightful
position and obtaining due compensation. The Essential En-
terprises case is in logical concert with other authority and
the contra result would not only have stopped the officer in
this case from receiving proper compensation but would
also have established a precedent closing the courts to other
corporate officers suffering under similar board actions.
BERNARD LEE FRIEDMAN.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Federal Power Commission
- Policy of Rate Determination of Independent Producers
of Natural Gas. - As a result of problems and inequities
encountered in assessing rates using the accepted rate base
cost of service method discussed in Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany Opinion No. 338, Docket No. 1148, thie Federal Power
Commission issued a Statement of General Policy No. 61-1
September 28, 1960. The statement promulgated an area
rate method of price regulation for wholesales of natural gas
in interstate commerce by independent producers. The rate
base cost of service, which includes original cost, Vrudent
investment return, allowing for operating expenses, depletion,
depreciation, and taxes, is traditionally used in regulating
utilities .with fixed capital outlays and anticipated operating
expenses. The FPC distinguished this situation 'from inde-
pendent producers of natural gas whose capitalized invest-
ment and operating expenses vary with the success of explo-
ration and drilling costs. Also, it is the policy of the FPC
to furnish incentives for exploration, in order to meet the
demands of expanding markets. Finally, there is consider-
able administrative difficulty in attempting the regulation of
thousands of independent producers on an individual basis.
As an alternative to the rate base cost, regulation on a geo-
graphical area basis using applicable economic principles, ex-
isting prices and costs determined by a representative samp-
ling in an area may be utilized. HELD: Price standards based
upon area rate schedules are to be applied in determining the
acceptability of initial price proposals and increased rate
filings by independent producers of natural gas. Phillips Pet.
Co., Dkt. No. G-1148 (F.P.C. Sept. 28, 1960); Statement of
General Policy No. 61-1 (F.P.C. Sept. 28, 1960).
The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. ss 717-717w (1952) as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 717, 717b (c) Supp. II (1954), was passed
[Vol. 13
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by Congress in 1938 in order to bring under federal regula-
tion the sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce. It was motivated by the monopolistic practices of
pipeline companies which were beyond state regulation and
had exploited consumers and companies engaged in produc-
tion and gathering. F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Company,
320 U.S. 591, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944). The Act granted to the
Federal Power Commission, which it created, the authority to
fix rates, but Congress intended that the FPC allow suffi-
cient revenue for operating expenses, for capital costs (serv-
ice on debts and dividends), for the maintenance of financial
integrity, for the attraction of capital, and returns commen-
surate with other enterprises having corresponding risks.
F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Company, supra. At the same
time, rates were to be "just and reasonable" in order to guard
the consumer from excessive prices. F.P.C. v. Interstate Nat-
ural Gas Company, 336 U.S. 577, 93 L. Ed. 895 (1949). A spe-
cific formula for determining rates was not specified. City of
Detroit v. F.P.C., 230 F.2d 810 (D. C. Cir. 1956). The rate
base method of price regulation was approved by the United
States Supreme Court in a case dealing with a pipeline com-
pany. F.P.C. v. Hope, supra. A strong dissent in that case by
Justice Jackson recognized the difficulties in relating a com-
pany's investment to the amount of gas in the ground which
it controls. Justice Jackson also pointed out in his concurring
opinion in Colorado Interstate Gas Company v. F.P.C., 324
U.S. 581, 89 L. Ed. 1206 (1945), in which the rate base was
used, that the cost of service method created a different price
for gas from many owner wells, depending upon the effi-
ciency of the particular owner who was the seller. In City
of Detroit v. F.P.C., supra, the commissioner abandoned the
rate base method in allowing the Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Company to include a field price for gas produced on its own
properties. The field price was based on a weighted aver-
age, arms-length prices, and excluded the cost and operating
expenses from the rate base. The Court of Appeals disallowed
the field price on the grounds that it increased consumer rates
beyond that which was just and reasonable. City of Detroit v.
F.P.C., supra. In Phillips Petroleum Company v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672, 98 L. Ed. 1036 (1954), the Supreme Court held
that an independent producer of natural gas was a "Natural
Gas Company" within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act,
4
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thereby extending the jurisdiction of the FPC to thousands of
independent producers. This was based on the reasoning that
wholesales by such firms to pipeline companies constituted a
sale in interstate commerce. It is upon this decision that the
commission declares its Statement of Policy concerning rate
regulation of independent producers of natural gas. F.P.C.
Opinion 338, (1960). The courts have indicated that the FPC
need not require a specific formula, but is free to use what-
ever method is necessary in determining a just and reasonable
rate. Forrest Oil Company v. F.P.C., 263 F.2d 622 (1959).
The area basis of determining rates of independent pro-
ducers will undoubtedly be contested because of the holding
in City of Detroit v. F.P.C., supra, which requires use of the
rate base method comparatively or as a departure point. How-
ever, the proposed regulation under the area basis would pro-
vide a criterion of industry requirements and this is disting-
uishable from the ruling in Detroit v. F.P.C., supra, in which
the cost was determined on the basis of fair field prices.
Under the Natural Gas Act, the rate must be just and reason-
able to fulfill the legislative intent, and it must be high enough
to provide sufficient revenue for exploration and develop-
ment in addition to capital income requirements. The area
basis is definitely an improvement over the rate base and
should give the Commission more flexibility in meeting re-
quirements of the industry and in curing the ills which ex-
ist as a result of contractual escalator clauses between the
producers and pipeline companies which tend to increase costs.
The escalator clauses exist to perpetuate a seller's market cre-
ated by long term contracts that are desired by pipeline com-
panies in order to provide large amounts of gas reserves
which are necessary to justify large capital outlays for facili-
ties. Competition at the residential consumer level has vir-
tually been eliminated by consumer investment in high cost
durable goods which require natural gas for operation. The
consumer is less able to convert to a cheaper commodity be-
cause of the prohibitive costs. The industrial consumer is
more able to adjust to cheaper commodities and thus receives
a cheaper competitive rate. Therefore, the residential con-
sumer receives the brunt of a rate increase. In view of cur-
rent market conditions which reflect a guaranteed market
and the captive position of the distributor and consumer, a
more strict construction of "just and reasonable" will be re-
[Vol. 13
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quired to prevent exploitation and uphold the intent of Con-
gress. The area base method may satisfactorily fill this need
and protect the distributor and consumer from inequitable
prices.
ALBERT QUITMAN TAYLOR, JR.
SALES - Manufacturer's Liability - Implied Warranty.
- This action was brought by the purchaser of an automo-
bile and his wife against the manufacturer and dealer to
recover damages for injuries sustained by the wife while she
was driving a recently purchased automobile with a defec-
tive steering system. The cause was submitted to the jury
for determination solely on the issue of implied warranty of
merchantability. The jury found for plaintiffs and defend-
ants appealed. HELD: Affirmed: Under modern marketing
conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the
stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an
implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as
such accompanies it into the hands of its ultimate purchaser.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69, (N.J.
1960).
The restrictive rule that a manufacturer is not responsible
to a remote purchaser with whom he has no privity of con-
tract was founded upon the early English case of Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 10 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842). Subsequently, Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852), held that the remote vendee of a deadly poison could
recover on the ground that "the defendant's negligence as to
an inherently dangerous product, put human life in imminent
danger." Thereafter Justice Cardozo's decision in MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916),
rejected the idea that only fixed classes of articles are suffi-
ciently dangerous for liability without privity of contract.
The MacPherson rule, which has been generally adopted, is
formulated in the Restatement of Torts, where the manufac-
turer's liability is extended to the manufacturer of any chattel
"which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as in-
volving an unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily
harm." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395, comment b (1934). The
negligence action has always included within its scope in-
jury from negligent misrepresentation about the product,
George v. Skivington, L. R. 5 Ex. 1 (1869), and in the case
1960]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss1/14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
of the manufacturer this often took the form of advertise-
ments. Grist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243
N. Y. Supp. 496 (1930). These actions of deceit or misrepre-
sentation traditionally require the elements of fraud or neg-
ligence; but there are cases in which a manufacturer has been
obligated to make good a representation on a label or in an
advertisement where these elements were not so clearly pres-
ent, Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal.App.2d 933, 936-37, 197 P.2d 854,
856 (1948), and thus typify a shift from liability for mis-
representation to liability for breach of warranty. Lack of
privity of contract does not bar an action for breach of an
express warranty made to induce purchase, Studebaker Corp.
v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E. 2d 198 (1950) ; Cf. Odom v.
Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 328, 195 S.E. 2d 605 (1956), noted
10 S.C.L.Q. 12 (1957). Advertisements have been taken into
consideration in deciding the existence of a warranty. King
v. Ohio Valley Terminix Co., 309 Ky. 35, 214 S.W. 2d 993
(1948). Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d
409 (1932), held a manufacturer strictly liable for inaccurate
advertising, reliance upon which led to the ultimate purchas-
er's injury. The usefulness of this doctrine is limited to situ-
ations of actual reliance upon publicized misrepresentations.
Cf. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., supra. Extension of the relaxa-
tion of privity to implied warranties springs from the conten-
tion that "manufacturers often make representations to the
public which if made directly to an immediate buyer would
amount to warranties," and the reminder that, historically,
contractual privity was unnecessary, the enforcement action
being based on detrimental reliance rather than upon promise.
1 WILLISTON SALES 649 (rev. ed. 1948). In a growing minority
of states the requirement of privity in the food and beverage
cases has been disregarded, or avoided by means of some-
what technical legal doctrines: e.g. (a) implied warranty run-
ning with the goods, Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145
Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); (b) third-party beneficiary
contracts, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475,
161 N. E. 557 (1928); (c) agency relationships, Timberland
Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1932);
(d) fictional contracts, Davis v. Van Camp Pkg. Co., 189 Iowa
775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); (e) and a finding of strict lia-
bility on public policy grounds to protect human health and
life, Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 144 S.W.
[Vol. is
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2d 404 (Tex. Cir. App. 1940) ; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,
14 Cal.2d 272, 282 - 83, 93 P.2d 799, 804 (1939). An enter-
ing wedge to establish strict liability in cases involving other
than food and beverage situations was found in an extension
from food to food containers. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613,
258 P.2d 317 (1953). In this exploding bottle case the court
regarded the defective bottle in the same light as defective
contents. Shortly thereafter, a cause of action was allowed
on grounds of implied warranty for injury from a piece of
wire imbedded in a bar of soap, Krupar v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), and privity require-
ments were relaxed in a case involving hair dye. Graham v.
Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954). The case
of DiVello v. Garden Machine Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.
2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951), noted 5 VAND. L. REV. 149 (1952),
B. J. 223 (1952), has been cited by leading authorities as ex-
tending the strict liability rule of the food cases to a mechani-
cal product. This case concludes that a manufacturer should
be strictly liable to remote consumers on the theory that the
warranty runs for the benefit of "sub-purchasers as well as
those using an article; . . . the sale of the grinding wheel
carried with it an implied warranty of merchantability and
fitness for the usages designed and that such warranty ex-
tended to the workman of the vendee who was injured in its
ordinary use". Cf. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., supra.
Liability for breach of implied warranty would tend to pro-
mote safety by correction of defects at their source by in-
creasing the degree of care which the manufacturer will use.
"Best" methods of production can be made better, and the
safest way to assure care is to throw the risk upon the person
who decides what precautions shall be taken. Under mass
production methods, the manufacturer has become unduly
insulated from liability. The consumer lacks the means and
skill to investigate the soundness of a product, or to prove ex-
isting defects in its manufacture. A strict liability of the
manufacturer would serve to provide a desirable spreading
of the risks or of the loss caused by defective products. What
is in substance a strict liability already often is imposed in-
directly by means of a series of warranty actions, beginning
with one by the consumer against the retailer, or by means
of free use of the doctrine of res ipsa, loquitur. A more direct
imposition of strict liability would avoid waste and circuity,
19601
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and the results would be less haphazard. The public's vigi-
lance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers
to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices
such as trade marks. The manufacturer's obligations to the
consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship be-
tween them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a
product has become so complicated as to require one or more
intermediaries. The modern law should shift the immediate
incidence of the hazards of life in an industrial society away
from the innocent individual and over to a group which can
best distribute the loss, and place the loss where the most pres-
sure will be exerted to keep down future losses. Public policy
demands the holding in the instant case.
M. OBERMAN.
COPYRIGHT - General Publication - Loss of Rights.
in Literary Property. - Defendant, a Vice Admiral of the
United States Navy, delivered a number of speeches on var-
ious topics, some of which concerned ideas developed in con-
nection with his official duties. Texts of these speeches were
distributed to the press and mimeographed copies were made
available to his audiences and to all other interested persons.
No notice of copyright or other restriction was affixed there-
to. Subsequently, 'plaintiff publishing house sought to quote
from this material in a forthcoming book and indicated a de-
sire' to publish the speeches. Defendant supplied several
copies of the speeches, but denied permission to quote as he
intended to include them in his own book. Plaintiff brought
action for a declaratory judgment of the defendant's rights
in the material, contending that the speeches were govern-
mental publications and not subject to copyright protection.
Plaintiff further contended that the widespread distribution
of the mimeographed copies to the audiences and the press
constituted an abandonment of the literary property and a
dedication to the public domain. The District Court held that
although the speeches had some bearing on and arose out of
the defendant's official actions, they were not in the public
domain and remained the property of the author. The Court
also held that the distribution of copies to the press and the
audiences was a limited publication which did not constitute
an abandonment of the literary property or a dedication to
the public. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 17T
[Vol. is
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.F.Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959). On appeal, HELD, affirmed in
part and reversed in part. Defendant's literary productions
were not uncopyrightable governmental publications, but his
wide dissemination of mimeographed copies of the speeches
without any copyright notice thereon to the press, his audien-
ces, and other interested persons constituted a dedication of
the literary property to the public, precluding copyright pro-
tection thereof. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover,
F.2d - (C.A.D.C. 1960).
An author has at common law the exclusive right to pub-
lish his works unless this right is lost by his general publica-
tion of them. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15 (2d
Cir. 1906), aff'd 210 U.S. 839, 52 L.Ed. 1086 (1908) ; Werck-
miester v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir.
1904) ; Loew's Inc. v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 419, 115 P.2d
983 (1941). The only rights remaining to the author after the
general publication of his works are those secured by com-
pliance with the Federal Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. (1958),
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055
(1834) ; Holmes v. Hurst, 80 Fed. 514, aff'd, 174 U.S. 82, 43
L.Ed. 904 (1875). A general publication by such a disclos-
ure, communication, circulation, exhibition, or distribution of
a literary product, tendered or given to one or more members
of the public, implies an abandonment of the right of copy-
right or a dedication to the public. Werckmiester v. American
Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904) ; National Com-
ics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d
Cir. 1951) ; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmiester, 146 Fed.
375 (2d Cir. 1905), aff'd, 207 U.S. 284, 52 L.Ed. 208 (1907).
A limited publication communicates the contents of a work
to a definite group and for a limited purpose not including
the right of diffusion, reproduction, or sale, and does not re-
sult in the loss of the author's common law rights in his work.
White v. Kimel, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 957, 96 L.Ed. 1357 (1952) ; American Visuals Corp.
v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1956). Thus, it has been
held that the oral delivery of a speech was not a publication
thereof. Nutt v. National Institute, Inc. 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.
1929). An author does not lose his rights in lectures which
are delivered to paying classes, Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash.
L. Rep. 286 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1929), or even by radio broadcast.
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting System, 327 Pa. 433, 194
19601
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss1/14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
Atl. 631 (1937). In Hirshom v. United Artists Corp., 243
F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957), distribution of twenty-five hun-
dred copies of a song to broadcasting stations and professional
musicians for "plugging" purposes was held to be a limited
publication. In so holding the court stated, "Not a single
copy was sold. Nothing was said or done beyond the described
distribution to give any recipient of a copy the impression
that he could make any use of it without first obtaining the
writer's permission." However, unrestricted release to the
public constitutes such abandonment as to place the work in
the public domain. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712, 85 L. Ed. 463
(1940). Distribution of copies of a literary product to a
limited but non-interested audience with no indication of in-
tent to retain the ownership thereof terminated the author's
rights in his work. Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.
2d 702 (2d Cir. 1956). Furthermore, where copies of a man-
uscript were distributed over a long period of time to those
desiring them, without any manifestation of intent to limit
their use, sale, or reproduction, it constituted a publication
sufficient to divest the author of his rights therein. White v.
Kimmell, 193 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
957, 96 L.Ed. 1357 (1952).
The decision of the court in the instant case falls within the
accepted views on publication and is justifiable, particularly
when reviewed in the light of the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. Nevertheless, no general principle
may be deduced from this decision which may with any cer-
tainty be said to be decisive of future cases. This is because
the question is largely evidentiary and consequently each case
must depend on the facts and circumstances peculiar to it. As
a result, a decided lack of uniformity in the determination
of what constitutes general publication is to be noted in the
decisions from the various jurisdictions. As a means of se-
curing greater uniformity in this field, it is suggested that
the courts apply the rules determining publication strictly,
especially in view of the relative simplicity with which statu-
tory protection may be obtained. The limited audience and
use tests would provide a restriction upon the dissemination
which could be made without loss of common law protection.
This approach would not be unfair or unduly harsh to authors
and would protect the public's right to the widest possible
[Vol. 13
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dissemination of information. An author's interests would
be better secured by strict rules or standards that are fairly
clear and certain than by principles with potentially liberal
implications but vague boundaries.
JOSEPH E. HINES, JR.
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